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Liberals vs Romantics:  
Challenges of an Emerging 
Corporate International 
Criminal Law 
Carsten Stahn 
Holding bystanders and corporate agents accountable for 
international crimes is often at the periphery of international 
criminal justice. Based on its liberal foundations, international 
criminal law has traditionally been strongly centered on 
individual agency. In the industrialist cases after World War II, 
individual criminal responsibility was used to demonstrate and 
sanction corporate involvement in crime. Ideas of corporate 
criminal responsibility have been voiced in the post-war era and 
in the context of the negotiations of the Statute. In recent years, 
they have witnessed a renaissance in several contexts: the 
jurisprudence of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Malabo 
Protocol of the African Union and the Draft Articles of the 
International law Commission on Crimes Against Humanity. 
This contribution examines the strengths and weaknesses of 
individualized and collective approaches towards corporate 
wrongdoing. It argues that the way forward requires less 
‘romanticism’ and more realism. The appropriate space of 
corporate criminal responsibility needs to be defined better. The 
concept is still most developed in domestic jurisdictions. Its role 
at the international level is likely to remain modest. The main 
challenge is to develop the interplay between individual and 
collective responsibility, and to assess more carefully in what 
areas and in what forums collective responsibility may be 
pursued best.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Professor of International Criminal Law and Global Justice, Leiden 
University.   
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I. Introduction 
The legal regime governing criminal liability of corporations is in 
flux.1 There is a strong moral case to provide greater attention to the 
 
  
1  See Desislava Stoichkova, TOWARDS CORPORATE LIABILITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2010); Caroline 
Kaeb, The Shifting Sands of Corporate Liability Under International 
Criminal Law, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 351 (2016) (discussing 
evolving trends of corporate liability in international law); See also 
Robert C. Thompson, Anita Ramasastry &; Mark B. Taylor, 
Translating UNOCAL: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business 
Entities Implicated in International Crimes, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 
REV. 841 (2009)(discussing the Unocal case and its impact on changing 
corporate liability); Daniel Leader, Business and Human Rights - Time 
to Hold Companies to Account, 8 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 447 (2008) 
(discussing changes in international criminal law regarding holding 
businesses accountable for criminal offenses); Andrew Clapham, The 
Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law over Legal 
Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International 
Criminal Court, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 139 (Menno T. Kamminga &; Saman Zia Zarifi 
eds., Kluwer Law International 2000) (discussing the changes in 
jurisdiction over legal persons).; Larissa van den Herik, Corporations as 
Future Subjects of the International Criminal Court: An Exploration of 
the Counterarguments and Consequences, in FUTURE PERPSECTIVES ON 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 350 (Carsten Stahn & Larissa van 
den Herik eds., TMC Asser Press 2010) (discussing corporations 
becoming future subjects of international criminal law). See also Celia 
Wells, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (2nd ed., Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
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contribution of businesses to conflict and crime. The human rights 
accountability architecture has developed significantly over past 
decades. Human rights were traditionally related to violations of 
states against individuals, but private actors can hold positions of 
power and control exceeding those of states. As Ronald C. Slye has 
argued:  
“The rise of the corporation is analogous to the rise of the 
modern nation-state—both unite individuals for a common 
purpose, and both result in entities with an enormous potential 
for good or ill.”2 
International companies have played a critical role in extracting or 
selling natural resources from conflict zones since colonial times. For 
instance, Belgium ruler King Leopold famously exploited the Congo 
through the use of concession companies, which used forced labor to 
extract natural resources.3 Colonial powers justified such practices by 
moral and technological supremacy and the promise of access to free 
trade. During World War II, and in contemporary conflicts, 
companies have played a major role in supporting and facilitating 
warfare. In modern times, corporate actors have been involved in 
violations in several ways: as direct perpetrator of violations, through 
supply of goods that fuel international crimes, as providers of 
information or services that facilitate crimes, or through investments 
in conflict environments.4      
The rise of the business and human rights movement5 over past 
decades, contributed to creating a thicker accountability structure. 
International law has become hostile to the idea that a collective 
 
2. Ronald C. Slye, Corporations, Veils, and International Criminal 
Liability, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 955, 961 (2008). 
3. See ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, 
TERROR AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 117, 119, 125 (First Mariner 
Books ed. 1999) (recounting colonial times under King Leopold). 
4. See Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational 
Corporations and International Law: Where from Here, 19 CONN. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 7-8 (2003) (general discussion on MNCs various violations). 
5. See Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing 
the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework, OFF. 
OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusin
essHR_EN.pdf (outlining UN standards of international business). ). 
See generally Larissa van den Herik and Jernej Letnar Černič, 
Regulating Corporations under International Law: From Human Rights 
to International Criminal Law and Back Again 8 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 
7125 (2010). 
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company structure provides a veil against accountability’. 6 There is a 
rich compliance web for human rights violations that includes not 
only hard law, but soft law and voluntary compliance mechanisms.  
Violations can be subject to wide a range of sanctions, including the 
revocation of licenses (i.e. the ‘corporate death penalty’ for legal 
persons), temporary license suspension, the initiation of investigations 
and prosecutions, civil or administrative penalties, and warning or 
persuasion techniques. 7  At least three major liability regimes can 
hold companies legally accountable: civil liability, human rights 
accountability, and criminal responsibility. All of them expanded over 
time, yet the dividing lines are not always clear. There is, in 
particular, a deeper controversy about the limits of human rights 
accountability and the feasible reach of criminal responsibility. 8 
II, The pluralist legal architecture  
The idea that “companies cannot commit offences” (societas 
delinquere non potest) is a relic of the past.9 Early criminalization 
started in response to the industrial revolution. Many of the 
traditional theoretical objections against corporate criminal 
responsibility, such as the difficulty to ascribe mens rea to a juridical 
person or to inflict punishment have been addressed. Shifts from a 
naturalistic to a more sociological vision of crime make it possible to 
 
6. The image of the ‘corporate veil’ is often used to strengthen the case for 
accountability. On the role of metaphors, see Maks Del Mar, Metaphor 
in International Law: Language, Imagination and Normative Inquiry 86 
Nordic Journal of International Law 170 (2017). 
7. On penalties, see Art. 10 (4) of the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime. It states: Each State Party shall, in 
particular, ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance with this 
article are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or 
non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions. 
8. For a critique of corporate criminal responsibility, see Vikramaditya S. 
Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve? 
109 Harvard Law Review 1477-1534 (1996); John Hasnas, The 
Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal 
Liability  46 American Criminal Law Review 1329 (2009). 
9. See Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporations -A Study 
of the Model Penal Code Position on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 
U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 38, 40-41, (1957) (discussing the contemporary 
rejection of the historical concept that legal persons are unable to form a 
mens rea or to be subject to criminal liability); See also Andrew 
Clapham, Extending International Criminal Law Beyond the Individual 
to Corporations and Armed Opposition Groups, 6 J. INT’L L. 899 (2008) 
(discussing application, by contemporary courts across the globe, of 
mens rea requirements to corporate entities). 
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argue that corporations can perpetrate crimes,10 but the legal regime 
is highly fragmented.  
Domestic legal systems diverge in their approaches. Common law 
jurisdictions generally recognize corporate criminal responsibility. 
Continental legal traditions are more diverse. Many jurisdictions allow 
for corporate criminal responsibility, either in general or for specific 
offences.11 Other countries (e.g., Italy, Germany, Ukraine) remain 
more skeptical to the concept and resort to administrative offences or 
penalties to address wrongdoing.12 Some systems combine civil and 
criminal proceedings.13 This allows victims to link criminal charges 
against corporate defendants to tort claims.14 At the international 
level, there are seventeen multilateral international instruments with 
provisions on corporate criminal liability, including the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.15 These 
instruments recognize the potential responsibility of legal persons. But 
they leave it largely in the discretion of states to determine the 
appropriate kind of sanctions. This approach was recently followed by 
the International Law Commission (ILC) in its work on crimes 
against humanity. It decided to include a provision on legal persons in 
its draft articles on Crimes against Humanity  in light of the ‘the 
potential involvement of legal persons in acts committed as part of a 
 
10. As Bert Swart has noted, they ‘do not act in a physical, but they 
routinely decide whether or not natural persons will perform physical 
acts on their behalf’. See Bert Swart, International Trends Towards 
Establishing Some Form of Punishment for Corporations, 6 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 947, 951 (2008). 
11. Kaeb, supra note 1, at 380-381. 
12. See OHCHR, Corporate liability for gross human rights abuses (2012), 
32-33, at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/ 
DomesticLawRemedies/StudyDomesticeLawRemedies.pdf. See also  
Criminal Liability of Companies, LEX MUNDI, www.lexmundi.com/ 
Document.asp?DocID=1069 (outlining Italian legal criminal corporate 
liability); See also Corporate and Commercial Disputes Review, NORTON 
ROSE FULBRIGHT, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/ files/corporate-
and-commercial- disputes-review- issue-3- 138938.pdf (discussing 
Germany corporate criminal liability); Sergiy Gryshko, Ukraine: Ukraine 
Introduces Criminal Liability of Legal Entities Ahead of Schedule, 
LEXOLOGY, https://perma.cc/MKR5-BDJ4 (discussing Ukrainian 
corporate criminal liability). 
13. See Kaeb, supra note 1, at 386-387 (discussing hybrid civil-criminal 
systems). 
14. Id. 
15. Swart, supra note 10, at 949; G.A. Res. 55/25, United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Art. 10 ¶1-4 (Nov. 
15, 2000). 
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widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population’.16 It states that  
[s]ubject to the provisions of its national law, each State shall 
take measures, where appropriate, to establish the liability of 
legal persons for the offences referred to in this draft article. 
Subject to the legal principles of the State, such liability of legal 
persons may be criminal, civil or administrative.17    
Criminal responsibility of legal persons cannot be determined in the 
same way as that of natural persons. The methods differ across 
criminal traditions. Some theories attribute the conduct of agents to 
the company as a legal person.18 Criminal responsibility is thus 
derived from the criminal acts of agents, i.e. corporate officers and 
senior managers (attribution model).19 It is necessary to inquire 
whether the agent committed the offence, and whether that conduct 
can be ascribed to the corporation based on a relationship to the 
agent. The criteria used for attribution differ. The weakness of this 
model is that it poses causality problems in collective and 
decentralized networks. Newer theories admit that the conduct of 
agents is determined by corporate cultures and collective decision-
making processes, and take into account the aggregated knowledge of 
agents.20 Others hold the company itself accountable for its own 
wrongful conduct (organizational model).21 This approach takes into 
account that collective failures such as poor organization or 
communication may have caused the wrong. The organizational model 
thus ties responsibility to organizational failures, such as lack of 
proper organization or control. A classic example is a corporate 
 
16. See, ILC, Report of the International Law Commission’, GAOR 71th 
Session, Supp No 10. UN Doc A/71/10 (2016), 264. 
17. See Art. 5 (7), ibid., 248. The language is based on Art. 3 (4) of the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
sale of children,  child prostitution and child pornography, adopted  by 
General Assembly resolution A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000, entered 
into force on 18 January 2002. 
18. See generally Clapham, supra note 1 (discussion on legal persons and 
theories of criminal liability). 
19. Thomas Weigend, Societas Delinquere Non Potest?: A German 
Perspective, 6 J. INT’L L. 927, 931-933 (2009). 
20. On the ‘aggregation model’, see Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing 
Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and Imitation Toward 
Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, 4 Buffalo Criminal Law 
Review 641, 661 (2000). 
21. See generally Cristina De Maglie, Models of Corporate Criminal 
Liability in Comparative Law, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 547 
(2005) (discussing different levels of accountability and organizational 
models). 
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culture that facilitates violations.22 Corporate mens rea is inferred 
from the aggregated knowledge of agents. This approach forces 
companies to put in place adequate structures to prevent illegal 
conduct, in order to escape from criminal responsibility.   
III. Two competing schools In International Criminal 
Law 
In international criminal law, the idea of corporate criminal 
responsibility is less developed than at the domestic level. 
International criminal law has traditionally concerned itself with the 
responsibility of individuals.23 Neither the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
tribunals, nor the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and Rwanda (ICTR) or the International Criminal Court (ICTR) 
were formally vested with the authority to try legal persons.24 In 
national jurisdictions, courts have found business corporations 
complicit in gross human rights violations.25 Company against may be 
held accountable in several ways: as perpetrators of violations, (for 
instance use of forced labor or pillaging of resources), as accomplices, 
or as military or civilian superiors (e.g., private security companies). 
But it is increasingly questioned whether the individualized approach 
towards criminal responsibility responds fully to challenges of business 
involvement in crime. In many instances, it is difficult to tie corporate 
crime to an individual actor. As Thomas Weigend has noted: 
“It is not a single individual who sells poison gas to a dictator 
to be used in war crimes, but it is a firm, organized as a legal 
person that is the provider of the gas. It is not a single 
individual who buys and re-sells stolen diamonds and thus lends 
critical financial support to a dictatorial regime, but an 
enterprise specialized in such lucrative deals.”26  
The ambition to extend criminal responsibility coincides not only with 
the human rights-driven anti-impunity movement, but also with 
broader structural critiques of international criminal law. For 
instance, critical legal scholars and third world approaches to 
 
22. Id. at 557-560; See e.g. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) S 12.4 (Austl.) 
(Australian statute penalizing legal persons for conduct of unsupervised 
employees, agents, or officers). 
23. Slye, supra note 2, at 1. 
24. Stahn, supra note 1, at 351, 354. 
25. See Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy 
in International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1239, (2009) (discussing court rulings regarding 
gross human rights violations of corporations). 
26. Weigend, supra note 19 at 927-928.. 
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International Law have long criticized the strong focus of 
international criminal justice on atrocity violence and its neglect of 
the socio-economic causes of conflict and broader issues of everyday 
violence.27 Strengthening criminal responsibility of corporations and 
businesses responds to an ever stronger claim to penalize economic 
drivers of conflict, including Western companies and transnational 
networks. 28 
A symbolic moment is the famous decision of the Appeals 
Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon against a Lebanese 
media company in the Al-Jadeed case.29 It marks the first decision in 
which a hybrid criminal tribunal held a corporation criminally liable 
for contempt of court. The reasoning is filled with historical references 
and normative ambition. The Chamber noted: 
“corporate liability for serious harms is a feature of most of the 
world’s legal systems and therefore qualifies as a general 
principle of law… Corporate criminal liability is on the verge of 
attaining, at the very least, the status of a general principle of 
law applicable under international law.”30 
The Al-Jadeed opinion represents an old cosmopolitan dream, namely 
to decouple international criminal law from its traditional ties to state 
policy. The decision challenges the individualist tradition of 
international law.31 It deviates from the classical Nuremberg paradigm 
 
27. See Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to 
International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 77, 91 (2003) (discussing critiques of legal scholars 
and third world approaches to international criminal justice); See 
Joanna Kyriakakis, Corporations Before International Criminal Courts: 
Implications for International Criminal Justice Project, 30 LEIDEN J. 
INT’L L. 221, 222-23 (2017) (discussing the historical tendency of 
international criminal justice to inadequately addresses economic crimes 
and actors). 
28. William A. Schabas, War Economies, Economic Actors and 
International Criminal Law, in PROFITING FROM PEACE: MANAGING THE 
RESOURCE DIMENSIONS OF CIVIL WAR 425, 425-443 (K. Ballentine and 
H. Nitzschke eds., 2005). 
29. See Prosecutor v. Al Khayat, Case No. STL-14-05/PT/AP/ARI26.1, 
Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in 
Contempt Proceedings, ¶ 27 (Special Trib. For Lebanon Oct. 2, 2014) 
(discussing the decision of the Al-Jadeed case). 
30. Id. at ¶ 67.  
31. See Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal 
Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L., 561, 594 (2002) (critiquing the historical 
approach of international law and stating “by focusing on individual 
responsibility, criminal law reduces the perspective of the phenomenon 
to make it easier for the eye. Thereby it reduces the complexity and 
scale of multiple responsibilities to a mere background.”). 
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according to which “crimes against international law are committed 
by men, not by abstract entities.”32 It argues that the famous 
Nuremberg passage was an obiter dictum and not meant to foreclose 
responsibility of corporations as abstract entities under international 
law.33 It reflects a deeper clash, between what George Fletcher has 
called “liberal” and “romantic” approaches towards collective 
responsibility.34 A liberal conception of responsibility focuses on 
individual agency and abstracts individual wrong from collective 
action. The romantic view admits that international crimes are 
typically by their very nature committed in collectivities, and thus 
closely connected to some degree of collective will. 
The two traditions have been in conflict since the naissance of 
international criminal law. In the aftermath of World War II, the 
links between business and regime crime were investigated before 
military tribunals of the Allied Forces. German industrial agents, such 
as IG Farben, Krupp, or Flick faced charges for complicity in war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression in trials under 
Control Council Law No. 10. The tribunals intensely discussed 
theories of corporate criminal responsibility, but took a pragmatic 
stance. They found that private individuals could be held responsible 
under international law,35 but they did not try corporations as such. 
In the IG Farben trial (Carl Krauch and Twenty-Two Others), 
thirteen members of IG Farben, were found guilty of enslavement or 
plunder. The US Military tribunal held: 
“It is appropriate here to mention that the corporate defendant, 
Farben, is not before the bar of this Tribunal and cannot be 
subjected to criminal penalties in these proceedings. We have 
used the term “Farben” as descriptive of the instrumentality of 
 
32. United States v. Goring, Trial of The Major War Criminals Before the 
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, ¶ 223 (Int’l Military Trib. 
For Nuremberg, Germany, Nov. 14, 1945-Oct. 1, 1946). 
33. Al Khayat, supra note 29 at ¶ 64. 
34. See George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at 
War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1504 
(2002)(discussing this approach to collective responsibility and guilt of 
nations). 
35. See United States v. Flick, U.S. Military Tribunal Nuremberg, Trials of 
War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Judgment, 
1191 (Dec.22, 1947) (“International law, as such, binds every citizen just 
as does ordinary municipal law. Acts adjudged criminal when done by 
an officer of the government are criminal also when done by a private 
individual. The guilt differs only in magnitude, not in quality. The 
offender in either case is charged with personal wrong and punishment 
falls on the offender in propria persona. The application of international 
law to individuals is no novelty. There is no justification for a limitation 
of responsibility to public officials”). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018) 
Liberals vs Romantics 
100 
cohesion in the name of which the enumerated acts of spoliation 
were committed. But corporations act through individuals and, 
under the conception of personal individual guilt to which 
previous reference has been made, the prosecution, to discharge 
the burden imposed upon it in this case, must establish by 
competent proof beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual 
defendant was either a participant in the illegal act or that, 
being aware thereof, he authorized or approved it.”36   
Defendants were charged symbolically as company leaders and 
individuals to demonstrate the economic power behind Nazi atrocities. 
The idea of corporate criminal responsibility was discussed since 
the 1950s, but its feasibility for an international criminal jurisdiction 
remained contested. In the context of the negotiations of the ICC 
Statute, the concept of corporate criminal responsibility was 
controversial.37 Some delegations rejected the idea on the ground that 
‘‘there was no criminal responsibility which could not be traced back 
to individuals.’’38 Others supported it.39 The discussions addressed a 
broad number of practical scenarios, such as involvement of 
companies in arms trade fueling conflict, their role in covering up of 
crime sites through construction work, or their indirect contribution 
to forcible transfer of persons. France proposed a compromise 
solution. Corporate criminal responsibility was made dependent on 
individual criminal responsibility. The scope of responsibility was 
limited and conditional. It required a conviction of a company agent 
for acts carried out ‘on behalf of and with the explicit consent’ of the 
company concerned. The proposal read: 
“Without prejudice to any individual criminal responsibility of 
natural persons under this Statute, the Court may also have 
jurisdiction over a juridical person under this Statute. Charges 
may be filed by the Prosecutor against a juridical person, and 
the Court may render a judgement over a judicial person for the 
crime charged, if: 
 
36. Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, The U.N. War Crimes 
Commission, Volume X, 52 (1949). 
37. Joanna Kyriakakis, Corporate Criminal Liability and the ICC Statute: 
The Comparative Law Challenge, 56 NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 333, 
336–39 (2009)(discussing the ambiguity in the ICC Statute which caused 
alternative accountability mechanisms). 
38. See JERNEJ LETNAR CERNIC, CHALLENGING TERRITORIALITY IN HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A PLURAL AND DIVERSE DUTY-
BEARER REGIME, 85 (Wouter Vandenhole ed., 2015) (discussing Greece’s 
idea of corporate criminal responsibility). 
39. See generally THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE: MOVING 
FORWARD, LOOKING BACK, 210 (Jena Martin & Karen E. Bravo eds., 
2016) 
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(a) The charges filed by the Prosecutor against the natural 
person and the juridical person allege the matters referred to in 
subparagraphs (b) and (c); and  
(b) The natural person charged was in a position of control 
within the juridical person under the national law of the State 
where the juridical person was registered at the time the crime 
was committed; and 
(c) The crime was committed by the natural person acting on 
behalf of and with the explicit consent of that juridical person 
and in the course of its activities; and 
(d) The natural person has been convicted of the crime 
charged.”40 
The proposal was primarily guided by a functional objective, namely 
to increase the chances of victims to obtain compensation through the 
ICC reparation regime. It represented a compromise between the 
‘liberal’ and the romantic view. It went too far for those who 
remained opposed to the idea of extending criminal responsibility 
beyond moral fault and individual culpability of agents.41  It did not 
go far enough for those who claim that corporate criminality cannot 
be reduced to individuals.42 It also faced pragmatic concerns. Skeptics 
feared that corporate criminal responsibility would overburden the 
ICC and make criminal trials longer and more expensive.43 The option 
of civil or administrative responsibility of legal persons was not 
thoroughly discussed.   
 
40. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court, Summary Records of the Plenary 
Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, ¶ 5, U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf.183/C.1/WGGP/L.5/Rev.2 (Vol. II), (June 15- July 17, 
1998). 
41. Weigend, supra note 19 at 927-928. 
42. BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME & 
ACCOUNTABILITY, 45-46, (Cambridge University Press 1996); See e.g. 
Joanna Kyriakakis, Australian Prosecution of Corporations for 
International Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST, 809, 825 (2007) (“Features 
such as the commonly opaque nature of accountability within corporate 
structures, the expendability of individuals, the practice of corporate 
separation of those responsible for past violations and those responsible 
for preventing future offences, as well as the safe harbouring within 
corporations of individual suspects, can all contribute to the difficulty of 
locating individual wrongdoers, as well undermining any deterrent value 
of prosecution”). 
43. Cf. David Scheffer, Corporate Liability under the Rome Statute, 57 
HARV. INT’L L. J., Spring 2016 at 35 (noting the lack of support among 
national jurisdiction to justify the inclusion of corporate criminal 
liability in the Rome Statute). 
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Today, there are two competing schools. One school seeks to 
increase corporate accountability trough an expansion and refinement 
of individual responsibility. It is grounded in the liberal tradition of 
international criminal justice.44 It is based on the hypothesis that 
involvement in atrocity crimes results from the interaction of self-
determined individuals in collective structures and specific situational 
factors that drive individual agency.45 It cautions against the risks of 
overbroad standards of attribution in punishment and an excessive 
use of criminal law as an instrument to seek corporate compliance 
with the law.46    
The second school, the romantic approach sees virtue in holding 
artificial legal persons accountable as collective entities.47 It is more 
closely connected to the human rights tradition. It postulates that “no 
person, natural or legal, should be placed above the law  or be allowed 
to operate outside of the rule of law.”48 This view accepts that the 
blameworthiness of the behavior of corporations may exceed the 
responsibility of individual.49 It places the emphasis on the 
responsibility of a corporation as an autonomous agent.50 It relies on 
the premise that corporations enjoy a degree of functional autonomy 
that allows them to determine their own objectives, organizational 
structure and social identity and to make choices about the law.51 It is 
most vividly reflected in the passionate argument of the STL Appeals 
Chamber: 
“[M]odern history is replete with examples where great harm 
has been caused by corporations with the advantages that result 
 
44. See generally Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International 
Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. OF IN’TL L. 925 (2008) for a discussion of 
the liberal tradition of international criminal justice.  
45. Kyriakakis, supra note 37 at 345-346.   
46. Robinson, supra note 44, at 927-29, 938. 
47. See Payam Akhavan, Are International Criminal Tribunals a 
Disincentive to Peace?: Reconciling Judicial Romanticism with Political 
Realism, 31 HUM. RTS. Q., No. 3, 624 (Aug. 2009)(noting the general 
characteristics of judicial romanticism); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations 
and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L. J. 
443, 461 (2001). 
48. Al Khayat, supra note 29 at ¶ 84. 
49. See id. at ¶ 82 (noting corporations’ greater “power, influence and 
reach” than individuals corresponds to a greater responsibility which has 
not materialized in corporations’ actions). 
50. See id. at ¶ 83-4 (highlighting the differences between prosecuting 
corporations and individuals and the accountability of corporation as an 
entity). 
51. See id. at ¶ 82-3 (emphasizing the characteristics of corporations which 
make them difficult to prosecute in the same manner as individuals). 
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from the recognition of their status as legal persons […] In such 
a scenario, there can exist circumstances where the Tribunal 
may be unable, due to the complexity of corporate structures, 
internal operating processes, and the aggregate effect of the 
actions of many individuals, to identify and apprehend the most 
responsible natural persons within a corporation. Similarly, the 
prosecution of natural persons, rather than the legal persons 
that they serve, would fail to underline and punish corporate 
cultures that condone and in some cases encourage illegal 
behaviour. Punishing only natural persons in such circumstances 
would be a poor response where the need for accountability lies 
beyond anyone person.”52 
The scholarly reception of the STL approach reflects the clash 
between the liberal and the romantic view. Some have welcomed it as 
a step in the right direction, namely as “a foundation for further 
development of liability of corporate entities in international criminal 
law”.53 Others have decried it as a novel incarnation for international 
criminal law’s “dream factory”.54 
The recent adoption of the Malabo protocol55 has lent further 
support to this approach. The protocol extends the jurisdiction of the 
proposed African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples Rights to 
“legal persons, with the exception of States.”56 It is the first statutory 
 
52. Id. at ¶ 82-3. 
53. Karlijn Van der Voort, Contempt case Against Lebanese Journalists at 
the STL, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON BLOG (Apr. 30, 2014, 11:37 
AM), https://perma.cc/Z7M4-3H9S. 
54. The Dream Factory Strikes Again: the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
recognizes International Criminal Corporate Liability, SPREADING THE 
JAM (Apr. 28, 2014) https://dovjacobs.com/2014/04/28/the-dream-
factory-strikes-again-the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon-recognizes-
international-criminal-corporate-liability/ [https://perma.cc/L9F4-
M8Z2]. 
55. African Court of Justice and Human Rights, Protocol on Amendments 
to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, (Jun. 11, 2000). 
56. Amnesty Int’l, Malabo Protocol: Legal and Institutional Implications of 
the Merged and Expanded African Court, AFR 01/3063/2016, at 59 
(2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr01/3063/2016/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/49Y2-4TBU] [hereinafter Amnesty Int’l]. Article 46C 
reads:  
1. For the purpose of this Statute, the Court shall have 
jurisdiction over legal persons, with the exception of States. 
 
2. Corporate intention to commit an offence may be 
established by proof that it was the policy of the 
corporation to do the act which constituted the offence. 
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instrument of a regional court that contains a specific article on 
corporate criminal responsibility.57 It seeks to counter the de facto 
impunity that many foreign corporations enjoyed in relation to human 
rights violations on the continent, through the criminal responsibility 
of legal persons. It is drafted in broader terms than the French ICC 
proposal which derived responsibility from the control of company 
agents. As Joanna Kyriakakis has noted, it follows the ‘organizational 
model’: 
“This means that, rather than focussing upon the conduct and 
state of mind of specific individuals within the corporation and 
deriving the corporation’s fault from there, corporate culpability 
is instead deemed to be situated within the corporation itself.”58 
It relates criminal responsibility directly to the company policies and 
practices of the organization (e.g., policies of compliance, information 
sharing systems), rather than acts and and state of mind of individual 
corporate agents. Corporate criminal responsibility may thus exist, 
irrespective of whether a natural person is held liable or convicted for 
the conduct.  The Protocol allows use of constructive knowledge as 
proof, and provides that the collective (aggregated) knowledge of 
company agents may be used to establish responsibility. The Protocol 
does not require that the corporation must have caused or encouraged 
 
3. A policy may be attributed to a corporation where it 
provides the most reasonable explanation of the conduct of 
that corporation. 
 
4. Corporate knowledge of the commission of an offence may 
be established by proof that the actual or constructive 
knowledge of the relevant information was possessed within 
the corporation. 
 
5. Knowledge may be possessed within a corporation even 
though the relevant information is divided between 
corporate personnel. 
 
6. The criminal responsibility of legal persons shall not exclude 
the criminal responsibility of natural persons who are 
perpetrators or accomplices in the same crimes. 
 
57. Fransizka Oehm, Thinking Globally, Acting Globally, 
VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG (May 31, 2016), http:// voelkerrechtsblog.org/ 
thinking-globally-acting-globally-ii/ [https://perma.cc/Z25Y-RHN7]. 
58. Joanna Kyriakakis, Corporate Criminal Liability at the African 
Criminal Court Briefing Paper – ACRI Meeting, Arusha 2016, AFRICAN 
COURT RESEARCH INITIATIVE, http://www.africancourtresearch.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Kyriakakis_Briefing-Paper_-ACRI-2016-
Meeting.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY99-DY75] (last visited Sept. 27, 
2017). 
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the conduct. It was adopted quickly. It fails to define the concept of 
‘legal person’, as well as applicable penalties. Not all legal issues may 
have been fully thought through.59 It might even raise concerns 
relating to over-criminalization of legal persons.   
International criminal law is thus at a tipping point. The classical 
view that international criminal law is a system without a space for 
corporate criminal liability is under challenge. The future of corporate 
liability has two potential pathways: Strengthening individualized 
prosecution of corporate agents, or prosecuting corporate involvement 
in crime through a collective organizational perspective. Both options 
raise significant challenges. International criminal law has a stronger 
stigma, and partly different rationales than human rights law. 
Criminalization requires caution.60 Concepts from domestic law cannot 
be automatically transposed.  
IV. Extending Individual Criminal Responsibility of 
Corporate Agents  
One path to develop accountability is to develop the legal regime 
concerning individual criminal responsibility of corporate agents. This 
rationale is in line with the growing privatization of international 
criminal. It is nowadays widely agreed that business corporations are 
bound by the prohibitions relating to core crimes under international 
law.61 Corporate actors have made direct and substantial contribution 
to international crimes. Certain forms of economic crime have become 
part of atrocity crime.  
The legal regime has developed significantly since Nuremberg. 
Many of the crime structures and principles of individual criminal 
 
59. See Larissa van den Herik and Elies van Sliedregt, International 
Criminal Law and the Malabo Protocol:  About Scholarly Reception, 
Rebellion and Role Models, in Steven Dewulf, LIBER AMICORUM CHRIS 
VAN DEN WYNGAERT (Maklu 2018) 511. 
60. See James G. Stewart, A Pragmatic Critique of Corporate Criminal 
Theory: Lessons from the Extremity, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 261, 276 
(2013) (explaining that corporate criminal liability may be too blunt in 
some circumstances). 
61. Volker Nerlich, Core Crimes and Transnational Business Corporations, 
8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 895 (2010), https://academic.oup.com/jicj/ 
article/8/3/895/876111/Core-Crimes-and-Transnational-Business 
[https://perma.cc/BMX3-BXYA]; G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid, art. I (July 18, 1976), http://www.un.org/en/ 
genocideprevention/documents/atrocitycrimes/Doc.10_International%20
Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of
%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9RC-
NCGL] (expressly acknowledging the capacity of organizations and 
institutions to commit the crime of apartheid). 
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responsibility have been extended to capture conduct by private 
actors. The ICC has made it clear since the outset that corporate 
agents may face criminal responsibility for the use suppliers who 
commit crimes under international law.62 It has received various 
communications relating to business involvement in crime.63 In 2016, 
the Office of the Prosecutor has devoted some attention to the 
problems of economic involvement in conflict in its Policy Paper on 
Case Selection and Prioritisation. The Paper states that the “impact 
of the crimes may be assessed in light of the social, economic and 
environmental damage inflicted on the affected communities.”64 It 
mentions specific categories of crimes that are typically under 
prosecuted, namely  
“crimes that are committed by means of, or that result in, inter 
alia, the destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation 
of natural resources or the illegal dispossession of land.” 65 
This statement did not mention business accountability specifically, 
but had a strong expressivist effect.66 It triggered a wave of 
communications relating to land grabbing in Cambodia and corporate 
 
62. Press Release, ICC Prosecutor, Communications Received by the Office 
of the Prosecutor of the ICC (May 16, 2003), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B080A3DD-7C69-4BC9-AE25-0D2C271A9A63/ 
277502/16_july__english.pdf [https://perma.cc/75Q9-2NFV]( [T]he 
Prosecutor believes that investigation of the financial aspects of the 
alleged atrocities will be crucial to prevent future crimes and for the 
prosecution of crimes already committed. If the alleged business 
practices continue to fuel atrocities, these would not be stopped even if 
current perpetrators were arrested and prosecuted. The Office of the 
Prosecutor is establishing whether investigations and prosecutions on 
the financial side of the alleged atrocities are being carried out in the 
relevant countries). 
63. Lachlan Markay, ICC Won’t Prosecute Chevron, THE WASHINGTON 
FREE BEACON (Apr. 2, 2015, 3:15 PM), http://freebeacon.com/ 
issues/icc-wont-prosecute-chevron/ [https://perma.cc/3ESS-BW5N]. 
64. Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and 
Prioritisation, ¶ 41 (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-
Selection_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FSR-WZ9Z] [hereinafter Policy 
Paper] (emphasis added). 
65. Id.  
66. See Nadia Bernaz, An Analysis of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s 
Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritization from the Perspective 
of Business and Human Rights, 15 J. IN’TL CRIM. JUST. 527 (July 1, 
2017), https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article/doi/10.1093/jicj/mqx031/ 
4080836/An-Analysis-of-the-ICC-Office-of-the-Prosecutors 
[https://perma.cc/KP7T-9CU5](explaining that the policy paper could 
lead to a “surge of communications referring to business related 
crimes”). 
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involvement in crimes against asylum seekers in detention centers in 
Nauru and Manus Island.67 In May 2017, a coalition of human rights 
groups requested the Prosecutor to investigate corporate complicity of 
Chiquita Brands executives in crimes against humanity committed by 
Colombian paramilitaries.68 But, extending individual criminal 
responsibility faces several challenges.  
A. The enforcement dilemma 
The first challenge is the enforcement dilemma. Business related 
prosecutions happen at a comparatively low rate.69 Domestic 
jurisdictions can prosecute corporate agents, irrespective of whether 
the company is in incorporated in their jurisdiction. States, however, 
are often reluctant to engage in investigations and prosecutions 
against foreign agents, due to fears of negative economic consequences 
or dependence on foreign investment, or difficulties to obtain 
evidence. 70 Crimes are often part of a larger supply chain that is 
difficult to establish or linked to violations that do not cross the 
threshold of international crimes. The underlying cases are complex in 
legal terms, due to the need to establish the nexus between the agent 
and the crime and to prove the necessary mental element. They may 
require significant resources and exceed the capacity of local courts. 
Universal jurisdiction cases are rare. 71 Cases are usually initiated by 
 
67. See Communiqué to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court Under Article 15 of the Rome Statute, The Situation in 
Nauru and Manus Island: Liability for Crimes against Humanity in the 
Detention of Refugees and Asylum Seekers, at 96, 103 (February 14, 
2017), 
https://www.academia.edu/31462935/The_Situation_in_Nauru_and_
Manus_Island_Liability_for_crimes_against_humanity_in_the_deten
tion_of_refugees_and_asylum_seekers [https://perma.cc/2DF3-GC44] 
(explaining the corporate involvement in crimes in Nauru and Manus 
Island). 
68. See FIDH, ‘Human Rights Coalition Calls on ICC to Investigate Role of 
Chiquita Executives in Contributing to Crimes against Humanity’, 18 
May 2017, at https://www.fidh.org/en/region/americas/colombia/ 
human-rights-coalition-calls-on-icc-to-investigate-role-of-chiquita. 
69. See Kyle Rex Jacobson, Doing Business with the Devil: The Challenges 
of Prosecuting Corporate Officials whose Business Transactions 
Facilitate War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 56 A.F.L. REV. 
167, 169 (2005) (explaining the “hesitance to prosecute people for just 
‘doing business’”). 
70. For a recent survey, see Dieneke de Vos, Corporate Responsibility for 
International Crimes, Just Security, 30 November 2017, at 
https://www.justsecurity.org/47452/corporate-criminal-accountability-
international-crimes/.  
71. On the Dutch situation, see WODC, DUTIES OF CARE OF DUTCH 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE 
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the national state of the offender, or the territorial state. Moreover, 
powerful states often have less political incentive to initiate cases for 
atrocity crimes than classical economic offences, such as corruption.72 
Prosecuting anti-corruption practices in foreign states reduces local 
competitive advantages. It thus benefits the interests of foreign 
investment. Atrocity crime prosecution may offer less material 
benefits.   
International criminal courts and tribunals are highly selective in 
their selection of cases.73 Corporate involvement in crime has enjoyed 
limited attention.74 In mass atrocity situations, Prosecutors try to 
capture a blueprint of the criminality in a given conflict situation, 
focusing on the most responsible leaders or the most serious crimes.75 
Bystanders or economic drivers of conflict are often at the margins.76 
Extending individual criminal responsibility of corporate agents would 
require a slightly different prosecutorial strategy, namely a more 
pronounced commitment to certain thematic prosecutions focused on 
business criminality. 
B. The scope of liability 
A second challenge is the legal approach towards network 
criminality. In past decades, international criminal law has been 
significantly developed to capture new types of criminality. It has 
developed techniques to hold persons accountable who act remotely 
 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, December 2015, 10  (‘From the very limited 
number of criminal cases in the ICSR context that the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office has decided to prosecute, it seems to follow that the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office does not opt for the prosecution of business-
related human rights abuses in prioritizing the types of cases for which 
to deploy the scarce means for criminal investigation and prosecution’). 
The report is at https://www.wodc.nl/binaries/2531-summary_tcm28-
124392.pdf. 
72. Ole Kristian Fauchald & Jo Stigen, Corporate Responsibility Before 
International Institutions, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1025, 1044 
(2009). 
73. Philippe Kirsch, The International Criminal Court: Current Issues and 
Perspectives, 64 WTR LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3 (2001). 
74. Bernaz, supra note 59. 
75. Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, at 3-7, 
ICC-OTP (2003), https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f- 
42b7-8b25-60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/62W7-JHFF]. 
76. See Otto Spijkers, Bystander Obligations at the Domestic and 
International Level Compared, 6 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L LAW 47, 51 
(2014), http://www.gojil.eu/issues/61/61_article_spijkers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CEJ2-F9JH] (explaining why many States do not 
hold bystanders legally responsible for standing idly by during a 
criminal offense). 
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from the scene of crime.77 There is a fundamental tension between 
individual culpability and responsibility for involvement in collective 
crime. 
1. Perpetration  
It is uncontroversial that corporate agents may face direct 
responsibility as perpetrators.78 For instance, private security 
contractors or company officials may be held accountable if they 
commit war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.79 Classical 
examples are sexual offences, torture, slave labor or modern types of 
slavery that meet the definition of international crimes. For instance 
after World War II, Flick and IG Farben officials were convicted for 
using prisoners of war to meet their production quota.  
One of the problems of determining responsibility as a perpetrator 
is the collective and decentralized nature of decision-making processes 
in corporate structures. International criminal law has developed 
special doctrine to deal with system criminality. There are different 
theories. In the Lubanga case, the ICC held that 
“principals to a crime are not limited to those who, in spite of 
being removed from the scene of the crime, control or 
mastermind its commission because they decide whether and 
how the offence will be committed.”80 
This control theory has expanded to include “control over an 
organization”. 81  In these cases, a perpetrator commits the crime 
through another person by means of control over an organization. The 
 
77. See Hans Vest, Business Leaders and the Modes of Individual Criminal 
Responsibility under International Law, 8 J.  INT’L CRIM. JUST. 851, 864-
65 (2010), https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article/8/3/851/876077/ 
Business-Leaders-and-the-Modes-of-Individual [https://perma.cc/Y62L-
UE8V] (“A person who contributes ‘in any other way’ to the . . . 
commission of a crime ‘by a group of persons acting with a common 
purpose’ will, according to Article 25(3)(d) ICC Statute, also incur 
individual criminal responsibility”). 
78. C. Lehnhardt, Individual Liability of Private Military Personnel under 
International Criminal Law, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1015,1022 (2008).  
79. Id. at 1030.  
80. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 920 (Jan. 29,2007), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.PDF. 
81. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the 
Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG, 07 March 2014, paras. 1404-1410. 
See Jens David Ohlin, Elies van Sliedregt, and Thomas Weigend, 
Assessing the Control-Theory , 26 LJIL 725 (2013); Neha Jain, The 
Control Theory of Perpetration in International Criminal Law, 12 
Chicago Journal of International Law 158 (2011). 
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organizational theory has traditionally applied in the context of 
crimes committed through hierarchical organizations of power. 
German Scholar Claus Roxin developed the idea that a person who 
leads a hierarchically structured military or political organization may 
be held accountable as principal for crimes committed by subordinates 
in that organization if he or she dominated the will of that 
organization.82 The decisive criterion is whether the choice of members 
of the organization is controlled through leadership. Roxin used three 
criteria: the existence of hierarchical organizational structures that 
facilitates rule determined processes, the exchangeable nature of the 
members of the organizations, and a focus of organizational activity 
that is outside the law. The classical example is state-organized 
criminality. Roxin sought to capture crimes committed by Nazi 
leaders through organizations such as the SS.83 But the relevance of 
this theory goes beyond state-based crime. The ICC extended it to 
control structures inside non-state actors, such as organized armed 
groups. It held that  
“this type of structure … is not …inconsistent with the very 
varied manifestations of modern-day group criminality wherever 
it arises.” 84 
The theory has also relevance for business criminality. For instance, 
German courts have suggested extending the concept of 
organizational control to business enterprises.85  They have argued 
that leaders of business organization can be held accountable as 
perpetrators for crimes committed by subordinates in corporate 
structures, based on the organizational rules  and structures found 
within corporations.86 The idea of organizational control might for 
instance, apply in relations between parent corporations and its 
subsidiaries. But in the business context, criteria such as hierarchical 
structure, the replaceable nature of company members, or the lawless 
nature of the operation are more difficult to establish than in the 
context of military or para-military structures.87    
82. See Thomas Weigend, Perpetration through an Organization:  The 
Unexpected Career of German Legal Concept, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 91, 
107 (2011). 
83. Id.  
84. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, supra note 81, para. 1410. See also 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 1179 (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05296.PDF. 
85. Judgment of 26 July 1994 against Former Minister of National Defense 
Kebler and Others, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 211, 221 (2011). 
86. Id.  
87. Weigend, supra note 82 at 98.  
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2 The controversy over aiding and abetting  
Most types of business involvement in international crime happen 
indirectly. It is difficult to determine under what circumstances 
professional commercial activities may constitute assistance or 
otherwise participation in a crime.88 The treatment depends on the 
nature of the contribution. Inconsequential or trivial contributions 
might not cross the line from a human rights violation to a criminal 
act. Criminalization requires a departure from regular commercial 
behavior. The treatment might vary according to the nature of the 
traded object (e.g., harmless goods vs dangerous, risky or prohibited 
goods) or the nexus of the contribution to the relevant crimes (e.g., 
loan to an atrocity regime).  
Due to novel human rights and fact-finding mechanisms, 
international crimes are relatively well documented internationally. 
There are increasing due diligence duties. For instance, Art. 6 (3) of 
the Arms Trade Treaty prohibits transfers of arms in cases where a 
state has knowledge that the items would be used to commit 
genocide, crimes against humanity or certain serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.89 It requires risk determinations.90 
This changing normative environment has repercussions for standards 
of corporate behavior. Certain commercial activities, such as trade 
with certain militia forces or regimes with a track record in serious 
human rights violations, are more suspect than others. A relevant 
criterion for accessorial liability is whether the contribution of the 
corporate agent increases the risk in relation to the commission of 
crimes.91  
The International Commission of Jurists has developed a useful 
taxonomy that might provide some guidance. 92 It includes, first of all, 
 
88. See William A. Schabas, Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: 
Catching the Accomplices, 83 INT’L REV. Red Cross 439 (2001). 
89. G.A. Res. 69/49, The Arms Trade Treaty art. 6 (Dec. 24, 2014) (“A 
State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms 
covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or 
Article 4, if it has knowledge at the time of authorization that the arms 
or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks 
directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other 
war crimes as defined by international agreements to which it is a 
Party”). 
90. ANDREW CLAPHAM ET AL., THE ARMS TRADE TREATY: A COMMENTARY 
208-209 (Oxford 2016).   
91. KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 165 (Oxford 
2013).  
92. See Magda Karagiannakis, Report of the International Commission of 
Jurists Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International 
Crimes, 2 CORP. COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY 1, 37 (2008), 
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the provision of goods or services used in the commission of crimes.93 
Classical examples are delivery of chemicals or arms. An early 
example is the Trial of Bruno Tesch and two others before the British 
Military Court in 1946.94 The two co-accused were convicted for 
supplying the poison gas, Zyklon B, to the SS for use in concentration 
camps.95 The trial showed they had knowledge that the gas was used 
to exterminate detainees. human beings provision of information 
which leads to the commission of crimes. Two more recent examples 
are the cases against two Dutch businessmen in the Netherlands.96 
Cornelius Van Anraat delivered of tons of thiodiglycol (TDG) to the 
Saddam Hussein regime which was used to create mustard gas.97 
Anraat was convicted as an accessory to war crimes committed 
through the use of chemical weapons, since it was evident that the 
quantity of TDG was not used for agricultural purposes, but for 
military activity.98  In 2017, Guus Kouwenhuven, the president of the 
Oriental Timber Company and director of the Royal Timber 
Company during the civil war in Liberia, was convicted as an aider or 
abettor for supplying weapons, and material, personnel and other 
resources to former Liberian President Charles Taylor and his armed 
forces between 2000 and 2002.99 The Court held that Mr. 
 
https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Vol.2-Corporate-
legal-accountability-thematic-report-2008.pdf [perma.cc/JC8B-ZQEL] 
(referring to the ICJ’s analysis of situations in which companies are 
alleged to have participated in human rights abuses). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 38. British Military Court, The Zyklon B Case, Trial of Bruno 
Tesch and Two Others, in LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, 
THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, VOL. 1 (London: 
H.M.S.O., 1947)  93 103 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Van Anraat was convicted as an accessory to the mustard gas attacks  
in the years 1987 and 1988. He was acquitted of complicity in genocide 
since it could not be established that he had knowledge of Saddam 
Hussein’s intent to destroy (in part) the Kurdish population. See 
Prosecutor v. van Anraat, Court of Appeal of The Hague, Judgment, 9 
May 2007, at http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/DomCLIC/ 
Docs/NLP/Netherlands/vanAnraat_Appeal_Judgment_09-05-
2007_EN.pdf.  See generally Harmen van der Wilt, Genocide, 
Complicity in Genocide and International versus Domestic Jurisdiction: 
Reflections on the van Anraat Case , 4 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 239 (2006).. 
99. See Prosecutor v. Kouwenhoven, Court of Appeal, Judgment, 21 April 
2017, at https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument 
?id=ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2017:1760. See Dieneke De Vos, Corporate 
Accountability: Dutch Court Convicts Former “Timber Baron” of War 
Crimes in Liberia, F. FOR INT’L CRIM. JUST. NEWSL.: MAY 2017 (Forum 
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Kouwenhoven “must have been aware” that “in the ordinary course of 
events” the weapons and ammunition he supplied and helped 
import would be used.100 
Providing information that leads to the commission of crimes may 
constitute aiding and abetting. Juan Tasselkraut, a Mercedes Benz 
Manager during the military dictatorship in Argentina, was charged 
for sharing private information about company officials with the 
military regime that led enforced disappearances.101 A similar case was 
brought against the Ledesma sugar company. Company officials were 
charged for providing personnel that aided in the disappearances of 
trade unionists.102   
Other forms of assistance include: “the procurement and use of 
products or resources (including labor) in the knowledge that the 
supply of these resources involves the commission of crimes,” or “the 
provision of banking facilities so that the proceeds of crimes can be 
deposited.”103  
The key problem is that the primary purpose of business activity 
is mostly to make economic gain, rather than to commit crimes. The 
scope of liability depends on the relevant mens rea.  Domestic and 
international approaches differ in this respect. For instance, Dutch 
Courts held in van Anraat that dolus eventualis of the defendant in 
relation to the commission of crimes might be sufficient in relation to 
war crimes, but cannot support a conviction for aiding and abetting of 
genocide as a special intent crime.104 
 
for Int’l Criminal Justice, The Hague, Neth.), May 2017, at 5, 
http://www.iap-association.org/getattachment/ c2983e59-0d5e-465c-
911d-723bcb05f1ba/FICJ-Newsletter-May-2017.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/ALN3-G78X].  
100. Id. at 7.  
101. Victoria Basualdo et al., The Cases of Ford and Mercedes Benz, in 1 
THE ECON. ACCOMPLICES TO THE ARGENTINE DICTATORSHIP 159-73, 168 
(Horacio Verbitsky & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky eds., Laura Pérez 
Carrara trans., 2016). 
102. Press Release, European Ctr. for Constitutional and Human Rights, 
Argentine Managers Summoned for Questioning on Complicity in 
Dictatorship-Era Crimes (May 15, 2012). 
https://www.ecchr.eu/en/our_work/business-and-human-
rights/corporations-and-dictatorships.html?file=tl_files/Dokumente/ 
Wirtschaft%20und%20Menschenrechte/Ledesma%2C%20press%20releas
e%202012-05-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZN8-YMZ3]. 
103. Ken Roberts, Corporate Liability and Complicity in International 
Crimes, in 1 SUSTAINABLE DEV., INT’L JUST., & TREATY 
IMPLEMENTATION 190-211, 197 (Sébastien Jodoin & Marie-Claire 
Cordonier Segger, eds.). 
104. Harmen van der Wilt, Corporate Criminal Responsibility for 
International Crimes: Exploring the Possibilities, 12 CHINESE J. OF INT’L 
L. 43, 61 (2013). 
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In international criminal law, there has been significant confusion 
as to whether aiding and abetting requires knowledge or specific 
direction.105 In the Perišić Appeals Judgment, the majority found that 
“specific direction” is a necessary element of aiding and abetting.106 It 
held that:  
“[I]n most cases, the provision of general assistance which could 
be used for both lawful and unlawful activities will not be 
sufficient, alone, to prove that this aid was specifically directed 
to crimes of principal perpetrators. In such circumstances, in 
order to enter a conviction for aiding and abetting, evidence 
establishing a direct link between the aid provided by an 
accused individual and the relevant crimes committed by 
principal perpetrators is necessary.”107  
The Taylor Appeals judgment and the Sainovic et al. judgment 
rejected this reasoning.108 These decisions argued that specific 
direction is not an element of aiding and abetting under customary 
international law based on an independent review of post-WWII 
jurisprudence.109 The trend points thus towards a knowledge-based 
approach.    
This controversy has direct relevance for business accountability. 
A specific direction standard would set a very high threshold for 
corporate criminality. It would imply that the corporate agents needs 
to share the perpetrator’s intent to commit the underlying crime. This 
would make it very difficult to bring cases against corporate actors 
that are mainly profiteers of war. The knowledge-based approach is 
more realistic. It implies that persons can be responsible as 
accomplices if they have knowledge that the main perpetrator uses 
the contribution to commit crimes. The relevant knowledge relating 
to the impact of contribution is enough even if the corporate agent 
merely intends to perform business activities. Tribunals have 
 
105. Charles Chernor Jalloh, International Decisions: Prosecutor v. Taylor, 
108 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 58, 64 (2014). 
106. Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Appeals Judgment of Judge 
Meron, ¶ 73 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013) 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/acjug/en/130228_judgement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MH8Z-V9DK]. 
107. Id. at ¶ 44. 
108. Prosecutor v. Šainović, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Judgment of 
Judge Daqun ¶ 1649-50 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Jan. 23, 2014) http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/acjug/en/ 
140123.pdf [perma.cc/UT7Q-NBE5]. 
109. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Appeals Judgment of 
Judge King ¶ 474 (Special Ct. for the Sierra Leone Sep. 26, 2013) 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/Appeal/1389/SCSL-
03-01-A-1389.pdf [perma.cc/BSN4-UPHT]. 
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established that the aider and abettor must know the main 
perpetrator’s specific intent in the context of specific intent crimes, 
such as genocide.110 
The ICC Statute is in many ways a sui generis instrument. It has 
a specific threshold. It requires that the contribution must be made 
for purpose of facilitating the crime.111 Neutral acts of assistance, i.e. 
acts that are per se harmless, become criminal only when committed 
with the relevant mens rea.112. The implications of this qualifier are 
contested. Some argue that this requires shared intent between 
accessory and principal.113 Other claim that a certain degree of 
knowledge is sufficient to establish the purpose requirement, since it 
relates to the consequences of a person’s conduct.114 The purpose 
requirement might be satisfied by oblique intent, i.e. certainty that 
the crime will occur in the ordinary course of events. This second 
interpretation is more in line with the Statute’s mens rea approach in 
relation to consequences and existing case law, such as the van 
Anraat case.115    
 
110. Prosecutor v. Kristic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, at ¶ 638 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001) 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf. 
111. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 69(3)(d), July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (“a person shall be 
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court if that person…in any other way contributes to 
the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of 
persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be 
intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the 
criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity 
or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the 
group to commit the crime . . . .”). 
112. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment ¶ 251 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 1991) 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/tjug/en/kvo-tj011002e.pdf.  
113. MASS. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.100, at 2-3 (2009). 
114. Elies van Sliedregt and Alexandra Popova, Interpreting “for the purpose 
of facilitating” in Article 25(3)(c), at https://cicj.org/2014/12/ 
interpreting-for-the-purpose-of-facilitating-in-article-253c/. See also 
Shriram Bhashyam, Knowledge or Purpose? The Khulumani Litigation 
and the Standard for Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, 30:1 CARDOZO L. REV. 245, 271 (2008) (arguing that aiding 
and abetting liability under the ATCA espouses a knowledge-based 
standard under both international law and domestic law). 
115. Harmen G. van der Wilt, Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and 
International v. Domestic Jurisdiction: Reflections on the van Anraat 
Case, 4 J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST. 239, 239 (2006) (discussing the mens rea 
requirement for complicity in genocide). 
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3. Common purpose liability 
Some systems contain even further-reaching concepts to hold 
persons accountable for contributions to collective crime. For 
instance, Art. 25 (3) (d) of the ICC Statute provides a specific 
liability regime for contribution to a group crime.116 It differs from the 
concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise developed by the ad hoc 
tribunals.117 It offers a potentially wide basis to hold business leaders 
accountable.118 It penalizes “any contribution’ made with (i) ‘the aim 
of furthering the criminal activity of criminal purpose of the group’; 
or with (ii) ‘the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit a 
crime.”119 This clause is framed so wide that it has been limited to 
“significant” contributions.120 It requires a minimum threshold in 
order not criminalize standard business behavior or contributions to 
non-criminal activities of collectives.121     
4. Superior responsibility 
A final concept to establish individual criminal responsibility is 
the concept of superior responsibility. 122 This theory combines 
 
116. Rome Statute, supra text accompanying note 111.  
117. Allison M. Danner and Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility and the Development of 
International Criminal Law (2005)  9 California Law Review 150 (2005); 
Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under 
the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 109 
(2007). See also Sofia Lord, Joint Criminal Enterprise and the 
International Criminal Court: A Comparison between Joint Criminal 
Enterprise and the Modes of Liability in Joint Commission in Crime 
Under the Rome Statute; Can the International Criminal Court Apply 
Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Mode of Liability?, at 57 (May 26, 2013) 
(unpublished Faculty of Law thesis, Stockholm University) (on file with 
Stockholm University). 
118. Vest, supra note 77 at 852-853 (providing possible modes of individual 
criminal responsibility for business leaders with regard to typical 
business activities). 
119. Rome Statute, supra text accompanying note 111. 
120. Prosecutor v Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10. Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 2011, para. 285. See also Zurab 
Sanikidze, The Level of ‘Contribution’ Required Under Article 25(3)(D) 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 83 REVUE 
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL 221, 226 (2012) (examining the 
contribution threshold in Article 25(3)(d)). 
121. THOMAS WEIGEND, How to Interpret Complicity in the ICC Statute, 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. BLOG, at 5 (Dec. 15, 2014) http://jamesgstewart.com/ 
how-to-intepret-complicity-in-the-icc-statute/. 
122. See Jenny Martinez, Understanding Mens Rea in Command 
Responsibility: From Yamashita to Blaškić and Beyond, 5 J. Int’l Crim. 
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omission liability and responsibility for crimes of others based on 
failure to exercise proper control in superior-subordinate relationships. 
Superior responsibility is grounded in duties of order and obedience in 
collective entities.  
The concept has its origin in duties of authority in military 
command structures.123 It has been extended to other contexts, such 
as police structures, private military companies or business 
enterprises.124 An early example in the field of business crime is the 
Flick case. Flick was convicted as superior because he knew and 
approved forced labor, and failed to prevent the acts of his 
subordinates.125 
Controversy surrounds what types of civilian superior-subordinate 
relationships the concept should apply to. In civilian settings, in 
particular contractual employer-employee relationships, concepts of 
effective control and disciplinary powers of superiors differ from 
military settings.126 Civilian superiors do not necessarily enjoy the 
same degree of disciplinary power over their subordinates as military 
superiors. This difference makes analogies between the two contexts 
unreliable. Mere positions of influence within corporate structures 
would not suffice to meet the effective control test. An ICTY 
Chamber has argued that it suffices that    
“the civilian authority, through its position in the hierarchy, is 
expected to report whenever crimes are committed, and that, in 
the light of this position, the likelihood that those reports will 
trigger an investigation or initiate disciplinary or even criminal 
measures is extant.”127   
The ICTR applied a relaxed threshold in the Musema case.128 The 
case concerned the responsibility of Alfred Musama, the director of a 
tea company, for participation of his employees in the Rwandan 
 
Just. 638 (2007); Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior 
Responsibility 93 AJIL 573 (1999). 
123. René Värk, Superior Responsibility, 15 ENDC PROCEEDINGS 143, 144 
(2012) (discussing the historical background of superior responsibility). 
124. Id. 
125. See The Flick Trial, Case No. 48, 9 L. Rep. Trials War Crim. 1 [US Mil. 
Trib., Nuremberg] (Apr. 20—Dec. 22, 1949).  
126. See Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 281 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tjug/en/brd-tj040901e.pdf. 
127. See Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment, 15 June 1999, 
para. 78.  
128. See generally Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment 
and Sentence (Jan. 27, 2000), http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/ 
files/case-documents/ictr-96-13/trial-judgements/en/000127.pdf. 
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genocide. The employees used inter alia factory vehicles and property 
in the commission of crimes.129 The tribunal derived Musema’s 
effective control from his power to appoint and remove employees.130 
It argued that he violated his supervisory duties and failed to take 
reasonable measures to prevent the crimes.131 This approach has been 
criticized for blurring the distinction between psychological pressure, 
influence and effective control.132 The reasoning implied that company 
managers may face responsibility for mere managerial failures.133 The 
crucial point is the knowledge of the crimes and the failure to report 
them. As Alexander Zahar has argued: 
“[The reasoning] does not distinguish Musema from any 
ordinary factor director. Yet it cannot be that all business 
managers stand liable to be convicted for international crimes 
perpetrated by their employees for the sole reason that they 
were only linked to them through commonplace ties of 
labour.”134 
Companies active in conflict must put in place proper management 
structures to ensure that superior exercise due diligence duties and 
take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent crimes by 
subordinates. Superior responsibility may, for instance, be invoked, if 
a business leader fails to prevent his employees from selling weapons 
to states or armed groups that are known for their involvement in 
international crimes.135 The doctrine should be applied with a certain 
degree of caution in business contexts, in order to avoid the risk of 
over-criminalization.   
Art. 28 (b) of the ICC Statute requires that crimes concern 
“activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of 
the superior.”136 This implies that crimes of employees that are not 
connected to their business functions. i.e. crimes committed outside 
working hours or company structures, might not be covered.137    
 
129. Id. at ¶ 901. 
130. Id. at ¶ 880. 
131. Id. at ¶ 905. 
132. Alexander Zahar, Command Responsibility of Civilian Superiors for 
Genocide, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 593, 601-02 (2001). 
133. Id. at 603. 
134. Id. at 602. 
135. Vest, supra note 77 at 871.  
136. Rome Statute, supra note 111 at art. 28.  
137. OTTO TRIFFTERER, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 1102 (3d ed. 2016).  
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C. Critiques 
Overall, existing law provides multiple legal options to hold 
business leaders accountable. There is no shortage of theories to link 
corporate agents to international crimes. There are, however, some 
structural concerns. The liberal school faces several fundamental 
constraints.  
One critique is that the path of individual criminal responsibility 
focuses the blameworthiness of corporate crime too much on company 
individuals.138 It struggles to take into account the collective dynamics 
of corporate crime.139 Corporate wrongdoing exceeds the wrongdoing 
of its individuals. Extending individual criminal responsibility to all 
different types of human rights violations by corporate actors risks 
placing excessive culpability on individuals for collective harm. 
Exclusive punishment of individual business leaders might produce 
judgments that exceed the share and guilt of individuals.140 Violations 
of individual business agents are often linked to corporate policies.141 
Some of them might not have occurred, had the individuals not been 
placed into a specific context by the company. The possibility to 
correct this through contextual sentencing considerations are limited. 
Due process concerns therefore place certain limits on the liberal 
approach.    
Second, criminal responsibility of individuals is often 
unsatisfactory from a victim’s perspective.142 Individual criminal 
convictions can be used for purposes of civil claims, but they often 
address only a fraction of the facts and causes of liability.143 The 
option to obtain reparations through criminal proceedings is still 
 
138. Al Khayat, supra note 29 at ¶ 82.  
139. See generally Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, The Allocation of 
Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and 
Acccountability, 11 Syd. LR 468 (1988). 
140. Al Khayat, supra note 29 at ¶ 83; See also Harmen van der Wilt, 
Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes: Exploring 
the Possibilities, 12 CHINESE J. INT’L L.  43, 73 (2013)(“Others have 
added that collectives have their own social dynamics, enticing 
individuals to conquer moral inhibitions. From that perspective, it 
would be unfair to single out the individual, as the crimes of the 
collective are incommensurate to his contribution and his guilt”). 
141. Weigend, supra note 19 at 932.  
142. See JAMES GOBERT & MAURICE PUNCH, RETHINKING CORPORATE CRIME 
79 (2003)(“Derivative liability, however, can be unsatisfactory for 
victims and companies alike. For victims and their families seeking 
explanations, the role of the company may not be revealed at trial, for it 
is sufficient for the prosecutor to show that an individual has committed 
an offence and that the individual is a person for whose acts the 
company bears responsibility”). 
143. Id.  
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limited at the international level.144 This creates critical frictions. 
Individuals may bear symbolic responsibility, while corporations are 
allowed to retain the profits gained from corporate activities.145  
V. Merits and Risks of Corporate Criminal 
Responsibility 
The option of corporate criminal responsibility remains 
underdeveloped in international criminal law. The STL decision marks 
an important step to address a structural bias inside international 
criminal law against the responsibility of legal persons. It seeks to 
counter some of the weaknesses of the liberal approach. It 
acknowledges that functional individual accountability alone is not 
likely to satisfy the problem of corporate involvement in international 
crime.  
A. The case for corporate criminal responsibility 
The idea of holding companies accountable as collective entities 
serves as a corrective from a retributive perspective. It is also 
attractive from a restorative justice perspective. Victim participation 
in criminal proceedings has increased in past decades.146 This has 
created high expectations among victim communities.147 Existing 
international and hybrid courts struggle to satisfy demands for 
reparation.148 Many defendants before international criminal tribunals 
are indigent.149 Reparations awarded by the International Criminal 
 
144. Fisse and Braithwaite, supra note 139 at 475.  
145. See Michael McGregor, Ending Corporate Impunity: How to Really Curb 
the Pillaging of Natural Resources 42 CASE W. RES. J. OF INT’L L. 469, 
490 (2009)(“[B]y focusing on the liability of directors and officers, the 
international community is allowing corporations to walk away with 
billions of dollars in profits”). 
146. See Carolyn Hoyle & Leila Ullrich, New Court, New Justice? The 
Evolution of ‘Justice for Victims’ at Domestic Courts and at the 
International Criminal Court, 12 J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST.  681, 681-83 
(2014)(discussing general shift toward greater victim recognition and 
participation and the nature of expanded victim participation, 
protections, and reparations). 
147. See also Charles P. Trumbull, The Victims of Victim Participation in 
International Criminal Proceedings, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 777, 807 
(2008)(“[S]ome commentators are concerned that victims may have 
unreasonable expectations about the compensation they may receive and 
will subsequently feel cheated when they are awarded nominal or 
symbolic reparations.”). 
148. Trumbull, supra note 147 at 804, 806-807.  
149. On the ICC approach, see Carsten Stahn, Reparative Justice after the 
Lubanga Appeal Judgment: New Prospects for Expressivism and 
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Court, the Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia or the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Senegal have remained 
largely symbolic.150 Corporate responsibility may offer a new pathway 
to award individual or collective reparation that is more 
commensurate to the harm caused. As Harmen van der Wilt has 
shown, in many cases “where business leaders as natural persons have 
been convicted on charges of complicity in international crimes, the 
corporation itself would have easily qualified for criminal 
responsibility as well”.151 
B. Caveats 
There are important caveats. The merits of the romantic 
approach should not be overstated. Some of the arguments in favor of 
broader recognition of corporate criminal responsibility deserve careful 
scrutiny.    
The first is the deterrence argument. It is often argued that 
corporate criminal responsibility sheds greater light on corporate 
misconduct and helps deter offences.152 This argument is pertinent in 
relation to natural persons. Business agents are even more likely than 
other perpetrators of international crimes to consider risks of criminal 
prosecution in their cost-benefit analysis.153 But legal persons do not 
 
Participatory Justice or ‘Juridified Victimhood’ by Other Means? 13 J. 
Int’l Crim. Just. 801 (2015)..  
150. See DRC: For the First Time, ICC Awards Symbolic Individual 
Reparations, FIDH: WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Mar. 
24, 2017), https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/international-justice/v 
international-criminal-court-icc/for-the-first-time-icc-awards-symbolic-
individual-reparations [https://perma.cc/B9VX-2Q8A](describing the 
ICC’s first symbolic reparations award to victims in Germain Katanga 
case); See also Andrew B. Mamo, History and the Boundaries of 
Legality: History Evidence at the ECCC, 29 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 113, 170 
(2015)(implying that actual reparations have not been awarded to 
victims of the Khmer Rouge, but arguing that such awards would 
“redeem [the victims’] struggles in a ways that all the narration and 
fact-gathering never could.”). 
151. Van der Wilt, supra note 140, at 72. 
152. See generally Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and 
Deterrence, 61 STAN. L. REV. 271, 271 (2008)(“[T]he threat of going out 
of business is commonly perceived as providing firms with powerful 
incentives to contain misconduct”); see also Van der Wilt, supra note 
128, at 273 (“Commentators typically assume that harsh corporate 
penalties, including the threat of going out of business, provide firms 
with powerful incentive to contain wrongdoing”). 
153. See Harmen van der Wilt, Genocide v. War Crimes in the Van Anraat 
Appeal, 7 J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST. 557, 567 (2009)(“While the average 
perpetrator of international crimes, whether imbued with ideological 
fervor or forced by the circumstances to participate in crimes, will 
perhaps be uninfluenced by the possibility of trial and punishment, the 
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necessarily follow the same behavioral patterns. Deterrence arguments 
relating to individuals cannot be automatically transposed to legal 
persons. Corporations are highly sensitive to reputational benefits. 
Human rights strategies, such as naming and shaming or transparency 
of violations may have more immediate effects than criminal justice. 
Criminal justice is typically slow and an ultima ratio instrument. Its 
added value to deterrence may be more limited than assumed. The 
expressivist effect may be more important. 
Second, in many situations, corporations are not the masterminds 
of international crimes, but rather benefit from a given situation. 
Corporate criminal responsibility is thus likely to remain exceptional 
in international criminal justice. The STL decision does not go as far 
as some business and human rights advocates might have hoped.154 
That decision concerned responsibility for contempt of court, rather 
than for core crimes under the jurisdiction of the STL.155 It was 
visibly driven by the hybrid nature of the tribunal. The criminal 
accountability of legal persons under Article 210 (2) of the Lebanese 
Criminal Code influenced the choice in favor of corporate criminal 
responsibility.156 The Malabo Protocol approaches corporate 
misbehavior as a regional problem.157 It is questionable whether a 
regional approach does justice to the global nature of corporate 
involvement in international crime. The extended scope of corporate 
criminal responsibility contrasts with the sweeping immunity 
concessions to senior state officials based on their functions during 
their term of office.158 This may hamper the prosecution of cases in 
which governments are involved in corporate crime.       
Third, detaching corporate criminal responsibility too much from 
individual criminal responsibility has downsides. As Van der Wilt 
rightly points out, “[p]utting the blame exclusively on the corporation 
entails the risk that at the end of the day no one is guilty but the 
abstract entity.”159 It is thus important to find the synergies and 
 
calculating businessman will probably incorporate the prospect of 
criminal prosecution into his cost-benefit analysis”). 
154. Kaeb, supra note 1, at 367-368. 
155. Prosecutor v. Al Jadeed, STL-14-05/T/CJ, Public Redacted Version of 
Judgment, ¶ 5 (Sept. 18, 2015). 
156. Id. at ¶ 69-71.  
157. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 56 at 5.  
158. See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 56, at 58. (“Article 46A bis Immunities: 
No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against 
any serving African Union Head of State or Government, or anybody 
acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state officials 
based on their functions, during their tenure of office”). 
159. Van der Wilt, supra note 140 at 74.  
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connections between individual and collective responsibility.160 The 
turn to a fully autonomous organizational model facilitates proof. It 
enables judges to infer corporate mens rea from the collective 
knowledge of the members of the company or corporate policies. It 
recognizes that the blameworthiness of the company may differ from 
that of individual agents. It might fill accountability gaps in cases 
where no individual cannot or should not he held responsible for the 
harm caused.  But it stands in contrast to the individual-centered 
investigative and trial culture of international criminal courts and 
tribunals. The attribution model is still more common in many 
domestic jurisdictions that recognize corporate criminal 
responsibility.161 For efficiency and expressivist purposes, it might be 
more feasible to pursue corporate criminal responsibility in 
conjunction with individual criminal responsibility. 
Fourth, the issue of corporate sanction deserves attention. 
Legally, it is perfectly possible to inflict criminal sanctions on 
corporations, such as fines and forfeiture measures, or even company 
dissolution as ultima ratio. The typical counterargument is that 
sanctions may conflict with shareholder innocence.162 This claim is 
difficult to make in relation to corporate involvement in international 
crimes. Shareholders who fail to check or control company policies are 
not truly innocent, but it is questionable whether criminal sanction is 
a more effective remedy for victims than civil sanction. The standard 
of proof required in criminal proceedings is higher than in civil cases. 
There is not a culture of litigation of mass claims. The scope of 
charges and incidents prosecuted is typically limited, and in the hands 
of the Prosecutor.163 This means that victims have considerably less 
control. Cases may be longer, and harder to win. Reparations are 
determined in a separate procedure, in which individual interests are 
often balanced against collective interests.164   
 
160. See id. at 77 (arguing that “complicity in international crimes of 
individual business leaders should . . . be a prerequisite for corporate 
criminal liability”). 
161. Anca Iulia Pop, Criminal Liability of Corporations – Comparative 
Jurisprudence, 25-26 (Spring 2006) (unpublished thesis, Michigan State 
University College of Law).  
162. Albert Alschuler, Two Ways to Think about the Punishment of 
Corporations 13 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law Scholarly Commons, Working 
Paper No. 192, 2009). 
163. Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutorial Discretion and International Criminal 
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VI. Concluding Reflections 
Investigating and prosecuting business criminality is an important 
prerogative. Selectivity has been one of the original sins of 
international criminal law.165 The failure to prosecute foreign 
businessmen and profiteers who financed and benefited from atrocity 
crime has been one of the weaknesses of international criminal justice. 
This challenge is gradually being addressed. It is widely recognized 
since Nuremberg that the corporate veil does not protect individuals 
from criminal responsibility. Despite the developing consensus about 
corporate accountability, the tension between liberals and romantics 
that has existed since World War II has never fully gone away.  
Modern criminal law doctrine remains largely dominated by a 
focus on the role of individuals in collective crime.166 It provides 
extensive, and sometimes maybe even overbroad concepts to hold 
individuals accountable in collective structures.167 Limited efforts were 
made to develop viable counter-models.168 The idea that crimes 
against international law can be committed by ‘abstract legal entities’ 
was only re-considered recently.169 The famous Nuremberg dictum is 
open to challenge. Corporate ethos is often a significant part of the 
conduct of individual agents.  But the question as to how corporate 
responsibility can be addressed best is still open. 
The idea of corporate criminal responsibility should not be 
romanticized. The benefits of criminal responsibility over civil liability 
or human rights accountability are not always fully clear. It is 
certainly too early to claim that corporate criminal responsibility is a 
general principle of law. The ILC has been visibly more cautious in its 
draft articles on crimes against humanity. It recognizes the 
responsibility of legal persons, but leaves states the option to choose 
between criminal, civil or administrative responsibility.170 
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The road has been paved by trial and error. The French proposal 
for corporate responsibility before the ICC very restrictive.171 The idea 
to insist on conviction of an individual before the pursuit of corporate 
criminal responsibility would have posed many practical obstacles for 
the Court. The Malabo Protocol moved to the other extreme. It 
disassociates corporate criminal responsibility fully from individual 
criminal responsibility. This poses a different set of problems.172   
The way forward requires less romanticism and more realism. 
Both individual and corporate responsibility are needed. But the 
appropriate space of corporate criminal responsibility needs to be 
defined better. The concept is still most developed in domestic 
jurisdictions.173 Its role at the international level is likely to remain 
modest. The main challenge is to develop the interplay between 
individual and collective responsibility, and to assess more carefully in 
what areas and in what forums collective responsibility may be 
pursued best.  
The role of the ICC will remain limited. The effect of the 2016 
Policy Paper should not be overstated. It is unlikely that there will be 
a broad range of new cases regarding corporate involvement in crime. 
But the transparency and stigma of communications may have a 
certain alert effect, with reputational costs for companies. It might 
have an indirect effect on compliance strategies, not necessarily 
through trials, but through the shadow of potential cases and the 
advocacy of civil society organizations.       
  
 
 
171. Richard T. De George, Peter French, Collective and Corporate 
Responsibility, 21 NOÛS 448, 449 (1987) (reviewing PETER FRENCH, 
COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984)). 
172. Briefing Paper from Dr. Joanna Kyriakakis on Corporate Criminal 
Liability at the African Criminal Court to the ACRI Meeting, ¶ 14-15 
(2016). 
173. Pop, supra note 161, at 49-50. 
